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THE INTERNATIONAL SEA-BED AUTHORITY
DECISION-MAKING PROCESS: DOES IT
GIVE A PROPORTIONATE VOICE
TO THE PARTICIPANT'S
INTERESTS IN DEEP SEA MINING?
This Comment focuses on the United States contention that the
International Sea-Bed Authority (ISA) decision-making process
fails to protect proportionately the interests involved in deep sea
mining. This examination includes the underlying purposes of
UNCLOS III and the divergent political and economic interests
of Conference participants in deep sea mining. Analyzing the
contention with respect to international economic and political
realities reveals its inadequacy as justification for treaty
rejection.
INTRODUCTION
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS M) first met in 1973.' The delegates attempted to draft
a comprehensive Convention 2 covering all uses of the sea which
would be acceptable to the 150 participating nations.3 After nine
years of negotiations, the goal of reaching agreement on the con-
vention by consensus was blockedA In April 1982, the United
States called for a vote during the session which had been set as
the final Conference.5 The United States voted against the treaty
1. H. BOKOR-SZEGO, THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LEG-
ISLATION 112 (1978).
2. The final results are embodied in the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Convention].
3. N.Y. Times, May 1, 1982, at 9, coL 1.
4. Through the consensus method, all attempts to reach agreement through
negotiations must be exhausted before a vote is taken. Consensus has been used
recently because economic and political power and population are not evenly dis-
tributed among nations. B. Oxman, A Summary of the Draft Convention on the
Law of the Sea (Feb. 20, 1982) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
5. STAFF OF HOUSE COMm. ON MERCHANT MARINES AND FISHERiES, 97TH CONG.,
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in a vote of 130 in favor, 4 opposed, with 17 abstentions.6
Essentially, the United States delegation rejected the Conven-
tion because provisions establishing the International Sea-Bed
Authority (ISA), governing deep sea mining, were considered in-
consistent with United States objectives. 7 One criticism of the
Convention enumerated by former Ambassador Malone was that
the ISA failed to give a proportionate voice to the nations most af-
fected by the decisions.8 He stated that as a result these coun-
tries' interests would not be fairly reflected or effectively
protected by the Convention. 9 Malone had previously insisted
that the ISA decision-making system reflect what he referred to
as the "realities" of the far-reaching political and economic inter-
ests of the United States in the ISA.1O These interests stem from
the United States potential position as the largest consumer of
seabed minerals, the largest contributor to the ISA, and the base
of several private firms desiring to invest substantial capital in
seabed mining." In addition, he claimed President Reagan's
objectives could not be met if access to the seabed minerals de-
pended on the voting power of the nation's competitors or those
who do not wish mining to commence.
12
The purpose of this Comment is to evaluate the United States
contention that the decision-making process in the ISA fails to
protect proportionately the interests involved. By balancing the
relative interests of the various participants with the current in-
ternational political climate and the Convention's objectives, it is
clear that the United States was unjustified in rejecting the Con-
vention on this point.
Analysis of the validity of the United States claim requires ex-
amination of several factors. First, the background of UNCLOS
I must be viewed to focus on the underlying purposes of the
Convention. Second, various interests of Conference participants
2D SESS., REPORT ON UNITED STATES OCEAN POLICY SINCE WORLD WAR IM THE DE-
BATE OVER A "1LAw OF THE SEA" 24 (Comm. Print 1982) [hereinafter cited as
MERCHANT MARINE REPORT].
6. United States Delegation Report, Eleventh Session of the Third United Na-
tions Conference on the Law of the Sea, New York, March 8 - April 30, 1982, app. H
[hereinafter cited as United States Delegation Report].
7. Id. app. I (statement by James Malone, special representative of the Presi-
dent for the Law of the Sea).
8. The other criticisms were that the seabed mining provisions would deter
seabed development; the provisions did not provide assured access for qualified
future miners; amendments could come into force for a State without its consent-
and, the seabed regime creates inappropriate precedents. Id.
9. 1
10. Id. app. B.
11. Id.
12. Id.
[voL. 20: 659, 1983] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
in deep seabed mining should be described to isolate conflicting
economic and political interests. Finally, the structure of the ISA
decision-making procedures must be analyzed to determine what
interests are represented and protected by the system. A compar-
ison to related organs of the United Nations is useful to draw
analogies between the relative representation and protection of
interests in a functioning entity. Since the underlying objectives
of the ISA and the United Nations are not the same, decision-
making procedures may require different techniques to protect
the corresponding interests involved. In conclusion, since United
States interests will be better served within the ISA framework
rather than through reliance on bilateral agreements and obsolete
customary law,13 the United States should sign the Convention.
THE FACTORS COMPRISING UNCLOS m
UNCLOS II developed as a result of changes in political
forces' 4 and their effect on customary international law.15 Estab-
lished maritime powers were concerned about rights of naviga-
tion.16 Developing nations desired recognized rights to ocean
resources and input in formulating international law.' 8
13. Law of the Sea Negotiations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Arms Con-
trol, Oceans, International Operations and Environment of the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1981) (statement of Elliot Richardson,
former representative of the President to the Law of the Sea Conference) [herein-
after cited as Foreign Relations Hearings]. An international convention signed by
the majority of nations could become a major extension of the rule of law. Id.
14. In 1945, President Truman issued the first major proclamation expanding
coastal state jurisdiction. Pres. Proc. No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 67 (1943-1948 Compilation),
reprinted in [1951] 1 UNTrED NATIONS LEGISLATIVE SERIES, LAWS AND REGULATIONS
ON THE REGIME OF THE HIGH SEAS 38. This led to similar unilateral actions by
many other coastal States resulting in disputes. MERCHANT MARINE REPORT, supra
note 5, at 3-4.
15. Id. at 2. Since the seventeenth century, the fundamental principle of the
freedom of the high seas was the basis of customary maritime law. Under this
principle the seas and their resources are open to use and exploitation by all coun-
tries, subject only to a three-mile area adjacent to nations which was considered
their sovereign territory. Id.
16. Id. at 9-10. The unilateral expansion of coastal jurisdiction had the effect
of closing certain straits which are crucial to navigation. The United States and
Soviet Union were concerned about passage through these straits. Id.
17. Djalal, The Developing Countries and the Law of the Sea Conference, 15
COLUm. J. WORLD Bus. 22 (1980).
18. Juda, UNCLOS III and the New International Economic Order, 7 OCEAN
DEV. & INT'L L. 221, 225 (1979).
Concern of Maritime Powers
UNCLOS I and I[ were held in an attempt to re-establish order
in .customary international law.19 In these conferences, the
United States negotiated to protect its interests in ocean fishing,
commercial navigation and military security through unimpeded
passage of warships.20
The delegates of UNCLOS I and U1 failed to agree on the
breadth of the territorial sea.21 This omission resulted in contin-
ued unilateral expansion of coastal state jurisdiction,2 2 protest by
the maritime powers,23 and conflicts over fishing rights.24 Con-
cern about questions of passage through straits led to discussions
between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1967.25 These
two States perceived the need to engage in a Third United Na-
tions Conference to settle issues of territorial limits, passage
through straits, and jurisdiction over fisheries and continental
shelf resources.26
The Common Heritage of Mankind
That the seabeds of the world are -the "common heritage of
mankind" is a general premise first stated by President John-
son.27 Maltese Ambassador Arvid Pardo developed the concept
and introduced a draft agenda item based on it to the United Na-
tions in 1967.28 He proposed that the seabed and ocean floor be-
yond the limits of national jurisdiction be declared the common
heritage of mankind, and that an international conference be held
to update the law of the sea. He asked that an international au-
thority be established to control, regulate and supervise the
"Area."29 The organization would protect the interests of man-
19. UNCLOS I met for two months in Geneva in 1958. In four conventions it
codified many areas of the law of the sea. The conventions were: the Territorial
Sea and Contiguous Zone, the High Seas, Fishing and Conservation of Living Re-
sources of the High Seas, and the Continental Shelf. H. BOKOR-SZEGO, supra note
1, at 107-08.
20. MERCHANT MARiNE REPORT, supra note 5, at 5.
21. H. BOKOR-SZEGO, supra note 1, at 108.
22. Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 13, at 7 (statement by Franklin D.
Kramer).
23. MERCHANr MAR= REPORT, supra note 5, at 10.
24. Id. at 9.
25. Id. at 10.
26. Djalal, supra note 17, at 22.
27. Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 13, at 295.
28. 22 U.N. GAOR Annex 1 (Agenda Item 92), U.N. Doc. A/6695 (1967).
29. The international seabed beyond the jurisdiction of States is referred to as
the "Area." It constitutes the subsoil and seabed beyond the limits of the conti-
nental shelL The Area and its resources have been declared the common heritage
of mankind. B. Oxman, supra note 4, at 14.
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kind and use benefits derived from activities in the Area to pro-
mote the growth of less developed countries. 30
The United Nations Ad Hoc Seabed Committee emerged from
this proposal. 3 1 The committee was the forum for negotiations
until 1973 when UNCLOS M first convened. A draft resolution
delineating the governing principles of the committee was
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1970.32 This
"Declaration of Principles" established seabed resources as the
common heritage of mankind.33 Although the common heritage
concept was overwhelmingly adopted, it became subject to varied
interpretations by industrialized and developing nations partici-
pating in UNCLOS I. The "common heritage" has been inter-
preted by developing states to incorporate the Declaration of
Principles and the Moratorium Resolutions passed by the Gen-
eral Assembly.3 4 The Moratorium Resolution states that in view
of the common heritage of mankind, States are to refrain from ex-
ploring and exploiting the seabed until an international regime is
established for regulating the seabed.3 5 Developing nations con-
sider exploitation illegal absent an international regime.36 The
United States views General Assembly resolutions, including the
Moratorium Resolution, merely as recommendations without
binding legal effect.37
30. 22 U.N. GAOR Annex 1 (Agenda Item 92), U.N. Doc. A/6695 (1967).
31. 1 T. KRONmLLER, THE LAWFULNESS OF DEEP SEABED MINMnG 23 (1980). The
committee was established in 1968 to examine the question of preservation of the
seabed and ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction for peaceful pur-
poses. It would evaluate the use of the seabeds' resources in the interests of man-
kind. Id. at 23-52.
32. Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed and the Ocean Floor, and
Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, GA. Res. 2749, 25
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970). It was the result of infor-
mal consultations by committee chairman Amerasinghe. He attempted to find a
common ground for the principles because the committee was unable to reach a
consensus in formulating principles for the seabed as the General Assembly had
requested. The resolution was passed by a vote of 108-0-14. 1 T. KRoI xLtR,
supra note 31, at 36-37.
33. GAL Res. 2749, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
34. GJK Res. 2574, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 10-11, U.N. Doc. A/7834
(1969).
35. 1 T. KRoNmmLER, supra note 31, at 217.
36. Id. at 207.
37. Id. at 217-220.
The Scope of UNCLOS IH
As a result of the divergent objectives of Conference partici-
pants, UNCLOS I became the most complex and prolonged in-
ternational deliberation in history.38 The United Nations required
that the Conference formulate a Convention, and enumerated
several items for inclusion.39 The items concerned the respective
rights and duties of States regarding virtually all activities at
sea.40 These activities include navigation, research, pollution, ex-
ploration and exploitation of both living and non-living resources
occurring in the newly defined territorial sea,41 continental
shelf,42 exclusive economic zone,43 high seas,44 and seabed be-
yond national jurisdiction.45
THE CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS AND THEIR INTERESTS IN THE ISA
The interests of UNCLOS I participants in the ISA vary dras-
tically. Industrialized nations desire unimpeded, recognized ac-
cess to seabed resources. Conversely, developing nations seek to
enforce their definition of the common heritage principle so that
exploitation of seabed resources benefits mankind as a whole.
The United States and Other Industrialized Nations
Current interest in seabed resources centers around potential
mining of an estimated 1.5 trillion tons46 of manganese nodules
which lie on the ocean floor. The nodules contain significant
38. MERCHANT MARINE REPORT, supra note 5, at 12.
39. 1 T. KRONMILLER, supra note 31, at 41-42.
40. B. Oxman, supra note 4, at 2.
41. The territorial sea is a belt of sea adjacent to a nation over which it has
sovereignty, including the seabed and airspace. The breadth of this area has been
set at twelve niutical miles by the Convention. The coastal States' sovereignty is
subject to the right of innocent passage for foreign ships. Id. at 5-6.
42. The treaty will allow coastal States exclusive sovereign rights to explore
and exploit resources of the seabed and subsoil of the continental shelf. The outer
limit is set at either 200 nautical miles or the edge of the continental margin. Id. at
8-9.
43. The exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is set at 200 nautical miles from a
States' coast. In this area, the coastal State has exclusive sovereign rights to con-
trol exploitation of all natural resources and control pollution. Other States have
rights of navigation, overflight, laying of cables and pipelines, and other interna-
tionally lawful uses. Id. at 9-12.
44. The high seas articles apply to all parts of the sea beyond the EEZ.
States are allowed freedoms of navigation, overflight, fishing (subject to conserva-
tion requirements) and laying of submarine cables and pipelines. Id. at 13.
45. The international seabed beyond the jurisdiction of states is the Area. Id.
at 14.
46. 1 T. KRONmILLER, supra note 31, at 14.
[voL 20: 659, 19831 Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
amounts of nickel, cobalt, copper and manganese.47 Industrial-
ized nations are particularly interested in obtaining these miner-
als because they are necessary for production of strategically
significant materials including steel and space-age alloys.48 Sev-
eral companies from various States are developing technology for
mining and extracting minerals from manganese nodules. 49
The success of deep sea mining by these companies has impor-
tant economic implications for industrialized nations. The United
States is dependent on imported nickel, cobalt, and manganese,5 0
and currently imports over one billion dollars worth annually.51
This expenditure is expected to increase to seven billion by the
year 2000 in the absence of deep sea mining.52 Deep sea mining
would have an important positive effect on the nation's balance of
payments. It would also promote independence from price fluctu-
ations and supply restrictions of land-based producers either im-
posed unilaterally or through a cartel.
5 3
The Convention creates an Enterprise which is the mining or-
gan of the ISA.54 Parties to the Convention are obligated to
finance the initial administrative costs and mining operation of
the Enterprise.5 Although the exact amount of funding neces-
sary will be determined by the Preparatory Commission,5 6 it will
47. McKelvey, Seabed Minerals and the Law of the Sea, 209 SCIENCE 464, 465
(1980).
48. Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 13, at 5. (statement of William P.
Pendley, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Energy and Minerals, Dep't of the Inte-
rior). Manganese is essential to the production of steel Cobalt is a hardener of
steel and is critical in the production of high-speed, high-performance aircraft. Id.
49. 1 T. KRoNmnHLER, supra note 31, at 16. The companies are situated in the
United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Japan, West Germany, France,
Belgium, Netherlands, Sweden and the Soviet Union. Many have combined to
form international consortia. Id.
50. Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 13, at 5. The United States cur-
rently imports 100 percent of its manganese and cobalt, 95 percent of its nickel and
15 percent of its copper. The majority of its suppliers are developing nations
which are not perceived to be particularly stable sources. Id.
51. 2 T. KBoNmuLER, THE LAWFULNESS OF DEEP SEABED MING 211, 255 (1980).
52. Mineral Resources of the Deep Seabed: Hearing on H.R. 11879 Before the
Subcomm. on Mines and Mining of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Af-
fairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 327 (1976) (statement of Conrad Welling, Lockheed Mis-
siles & Space Co.) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 11879].
53. Comment, The Future of United States Deep Seabed Mining: Still in the
Hands of Congress, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 613, 620-22 (1981).
54. Convention, supra note 2, art 13, para. 2.
55. Id. art 11, para. 3(d).
56. The Preparatory Commission will develop the rules and regulations for
deep seabed mining. The Commission will begin meeting 60 to 90 days after 50
be approximately $1 billion.57 Half the funds will be provided
through long term interest-free loans and the remainder through
loans guaranteed by the Enterprise.58 The United States contri-
bution would be 25 percent,5 9 or about $250 million. This one-time
fee is considerably less than current annual United States ex-
penditures for imported minerals.60 In addition, if the Enterprise
is successful, the principal on these loans will be repaid.
The Convention also creates a parallel system which allows en-
tities other than the Enterprise to mine.61 Companies will be
granted exclusive rights to mine an area after approval by the
ISA.62 Capital expenditures necessary to establish the initial
mining operations have been estimated at between $300 million 63
and $750 million.64 To justify these expenditures, mining compa-
nies require assurance of exclusive rights to mine sites and a suf-
ficient return on investment.65 In addition to the capital needed
for mining, the companies must make payments to the ISA.
These include a processing charge of $500,00066 and an annual fee
plus production payments after approval of the mine site.67 Taxes
will have a large effect on the profitability of deep sea mining. Of
course, incentives will have to be determined by the individual
governments involved.
To summarize, the interests of the developed nations in deep
sea mining are essentially economic. They seek unimpeded ac-
cess to the manganese nodules for production by mining compa-
nies, and for consumption by industry at the lowest possible
prices. They have the ability to invest large sums of money and
to reap huge benefits from deep sea mining. From this perspec-
States sign the Convention. Only States which sign the Convention can be mem-
bers and take part in its decisions. Those which sign the Final Act of the confer-
ence only, may participate as observers. United States Delegation Report, supra
note 6, at 11-12.
57. 2 T. KRoINArLEn, supra note 51, at 133.
58. MERCHANT MARINE REPORT, supra note 5, at 36.
59. Assessment of contributions will be based on the United Nations scale for
its budget. The United States percentage is the maximum of 25 percent. T. HOVET
JR. & E. HoVET, ANNUAL REVIEW OF UNITED) NATIONS AFFAIRS, A CHRONOLOGY AND
FACT BOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS 1941-1979, at 279 (6th ed. 1979).
60. See supra text accompanying note 51.
61. Convention, supra note 2, art. 153, para. 2(b).
62. Id. Annex III, art. 16.
63. Hearings on H.R. 11879, supra note 52, at 322.
64. Hearings on H.R. 3350 and H.R. 4582 Before the Subcomm. on Oceanogra-
phy and the House Comm on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
215 (1977) (statement of James G. Wenzel).
65. Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 13, at 31 (statement by United
States Ambassador Richardson).
66. Convention, supra note 2, Annex If, art 13, para. 2.
67. Id.
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tive, an ISA with minimal regulatory control to interfere with
mining is seen as the most desirable.
The Soviet Bloc
The Soviet States have mixed interests in deep sea mining.
They are currently established land-based producers and con-
sumers of the metals.68 In addition, they are developing seabed
mining technology and desire access to the nodules.69 As indus-
trial nations, they are closer to the United States than they are to
developing nations. However, politically they may wish to ingrati-
ate themselves to less developed States, 70 so that their ultimate
interests are presently difficult to determine.
The Group of 77
Compared to the industrialized nations, developing States have
broader and more general interests in the ISA. These countries
were suspicious of existing rules of international law which were
established before many of these nations gained their indepen-
dence.71 They especially focus on the freedom of the high seas,
which has been interpreted to allow those with navies to control
the oceans, and therefore the world.72 The developing nations
contend that their previous colonization was facilitated by these
principles.7 3 They viewed UNCLOS mTr as a forum to discuss all
aspects of the law of the sea and to establish their share of the
oceans' wealth as a matter of legal right.74
In 1964, these developing nations formed a caucus referred to as
the Group of 77 (G-77).75 The G-77 presently consists of over 120
nations from Africa, Asia, Latin America and Oceana.76 The G-77
68. 2 T. KRONmn.LER, supra note 51, at 411-415, 417.
69. E. LuARD, THE CONTROL OF THE SEA-BED 200 (1977).
70. Charney, United States Interests in a Convention on the Law of the Sea:
The Casefor Continued Efforts, 11 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L 39, 66 (1978).
71. Juda, supra note 18, at 225.
72. Djalal, supra note 17, at 22.
73. Id.
74. Pinto, The Developing Countries and the Exploitation of the Deep Seabed,
15 COLUm. J. WoRLD Bus. 30, 30-31 (1980).
75. M. SAUVANT, THE GROUP OF 77: EVOLUTION, STRUCTURE, ORGANIZATION
(1981). The member nations issued a statement entitled the "Joint Declaration of
the Seventy-Seven," which depicted their unity and conviction to develop new pol-
icies for international trade and development. Id. at 1.
76. Id. at 2.
successfully proposed a United Nations resolution 77 recognizing
their goal of establishing a new international economic order
(NIEO).78 The principles involved can be summarized as a de-
mand to redistribute the world's wealth and political influence in
a more equitable manner.79 To become viable economic entities,
these nations require the technology and financial assistance of
developed countries.80
To the G-77, the Enterprise represents principles of cooperation
and interdependence which are the bases of the NIEO.81 These
nations view the Enterprise as a funnel for both financial aid and
the transfer of technology, as well as a method for gaining techni-
cal and managerial experience.82 In addition, the G-77 wishes to
protect member nations whose economies are dependent on ex-
porting minerals contained in nodules.8 3
Consistent with this view is the G-77's strong support for the
Declaration of Principles.84 Member nations interpret the Decla-
ration to mean that under the common heritage principle, ex-
ploitation of the nodules must be a joint operation by all who are
interested under international authority.85 Based on this premise,
they envisioned the Enterprise as the sole mining entity. The G-
77 perceived a parallel system with private firms as a
concession.86
Although unified in its ultimate goal of the NIEO, the G-77 is
not a cohesive unit, as exemplified by diverse cultural elements in
their societies. 87 These nations are at various stages of develop-
77. GA. Res. 3201 (S/VI), 29 U.N. GAOR (Supp. 1), U.N. Doe. A/9959 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as NIEO].
78. The G-77 goals are for the member nations to lift themselves from an im-
poverished level to one of economic independence. They challenge the right of de-
veloped States to use the world's limited resources disproportionately to world
population, at the expense of the developing nations and the environment. Juda,
supra note 18, at 224.
79. Id.
80. Pinto, supra note 74, at 33.
81. Id. at 37.
82. Lee, Deep Seabed Mining and Developing Countries, 6 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L
& COM. 213, 216 (1978).
83. Ferreira, The Role of African States in the Development of the Law of the
Sea at the Third United Nations Conference, 7 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 89, 91 (1979).
Copper comprised 93 percent of Zambia's total exports in 1978. In 1979, cobalt ac-
counted for 46 percent and copper for 36 percent of Zaire's total exports. THE
ECONOMIST NEWSPAPER LTD., ENGLAND; THE WORLD m FIGURES 104-105 (1981). In
1979, manganese was 8 percent of Gabon's exports. Id. at 69.
84. Lee, supra note 82, at 215-216.
85. Id. at 214.
86. Id. at 217. Conversely, the United States wanted the ISA to be merely a
licensing authority, and private companies as the sole miners. Aldrich, A System
of Exploitation, 6 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 245 (1978).
87. The G-77 consists of three distinct cultural groups. The Latin American
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ment which could affect their economic priorities.88 The more de-
veloped G-77 countries are or will be consumers of minerals,
89
placing their interests in opposition to member land-based produ-
cers. These factors may result in the disintegration of a unified G-
77. NIEO principles could be subordinated to the individual inter-
ests of the nations involved. When an UNCLOS III issue was not
delineated by north-south conflict and NIEO rhetoric, G-77 mem-
bers had difficulty in formulating the group position.90 They were
especially divided on the representation and rights of land-locked
nations to the exploitation of ocean resources.91
In summary, interests of the G-77 in the ISA go far beyond po-
tential economic gain. These interests include recognition of their
legal right in ocean resources and in international political deci-
sions.92 They wish to further the NIEO principle of international
cooperation through seabed mining by the Enterprise.9 3 Although
presently united, these nations' individual interests may emerge,
deteriorating the cohesiveness of the group.94 In turn, this could
lead to a cross section of support for issues rather than a strict
north-south split as the United States fears will result.
9 5
THE ISA DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
An examination of the composition, functions and voting proce-
dures in the ISA's decision-making organs is required to analyze
the relative representation of the participants' interests. A com-
parison to the structure and recent voting records in the United
Nations is used as an aid to determine the validity of the United
States claim of disproportionate representation.
countries have a common language as well as historical and cultural ties. The Af-
rican nations are unified on the basis of their new independence and African Soli-
darity, but there remains distrust between the Anglophone and Francophone
States. The Asian members of the G-77 are the least homogeneous. Friedman &
Williams, The Group of 77 at the United Nations: An Emergent Force in the Law of
the Sea, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 555, 559 (1979).
88. Id. at 558.
89. Id. at 556.
90. Friedman & Williams, supra note 87, at 564-70.
91. See Ferreira, supra note 83, at 99-108.
92. Juda, supra note 18, at 224.
93. Pinto, supra note 74, at 33.
94. Friedman & Williams, supra note 87, at 574.
95. Id. at 573.
The Structure of the ISA
One result of protracted negotiations and ultimate compromises
is an ISA characterized by a complex organization and voting
structure. Many of the rules, regulations, and procedures remain
to be determined by the Preparatory Commission.96 The principal
decision-making organs of the ISA are the Assembly and Council.
The Assembly
The Assembly is the supreme organ of the ISA97 with the power
to establish general policies governing seabed exploitation. Be-
cause the Assembly is the plenary body, all parties to the Con-
vention are members.98 The Assembly, based on the principle of
the sovereign equality of nations, gives each member one vote.99
Although the G-77 could dominate the Assembly by numerical
superiority, the Convention includes constitutional safeguards
limiting the scope of decisions. 00 This protects special interests
involved. The policies established by the Assembly must be
made in conformity with relevant provisions of the Convention,' 0 '
including the Sea-Bed Policies.0 2 The first enumerated objective
is the orderly development of resources in the Area. 0 3 Thus, if
the Assembly attempted to make policies limiting mining compa-
nies' access to nodules, industrialized nations could invoke this
clause to block a decision.
The Assembly is also given power to elect members to the
Council and to other ISA organs. Selection of Council members
is governed by a formula set forth in the Convention. It requires
representation of special interests including consumers of and in-
vestors in deep seabed mining, 04 both categories where predomi-
nant United States interests lie.
The power to assess member contributions for the budget is
also conferred upon the Assembly.1O5 Contributions are based on
the proportionate scale used for the United Nations budget. 0 6
96. See supra note 56.
97. Convention, supra note 2, art. 160, para. 1.
98. Id. art. 159, para. 1.
99. Id. para. 5.
100. Id. art. 158, para. 4.
101. Id. art. 160, para. 1.
102. The Sea-Bed Policies state that activities in the Area shall be carried out
as specifically provided in article 150, in a manner to foster the healthy develop-
ment of world economy and trade. Id. art. 150.
103. Id. art. 150(a).
104. Id. art. 161.
105. Id. art. 160, para. 2(e).
106. Id.
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In addition, the Assembly has the ultimate power to consider
and approve rules, regulations, and procedures recommended by
the Council. 07 A separation of powers clause 08 prevents the As-
sembly from impeding the exercise of powers conferred upon
other organs. Therefore, the G-77-dominated Assembly cannot in-
terfere with decisions by the Council authorizing companies to
mine seabed nodules.
The Council
The Council is the executive organ of the ISA with power to es-
tablish specific policies governing exploration, exploitation,
financial management and administration of the ISA.109 It may
also approve work plans submitted by companies wishing to mine
nodules.110 The Convention establishes two subsidiaries of the
Council: the Legal and Technical Commission and the Economic
Planning Commission."'
The Legal and Technical Commission is required to make rec-
ommendations for the approval of work plans which satisfy rele-
vant requirements.112  By attempting to set forth objective
requirements, the Convention will ensure fair consideration of in-
dustrialized states' mining applications rather than leaving deci-
sions to be made in a more politicized environment. There are
also provisions designed to protect investments of "pioneer inves-
tors" who have spent over $30 million in pioneer activities of deep
sea mining."l3
The second Council subsidiary, the Economic Planning Com-
mission, makes determinations regarding supply, demand and
prices of minerals obtained from the Area." 4 This commission
will propose compensation systems for developing States which
suffer adverse effects from seabed mining."15 This will probably
be limited to land-based producers whose economies are heavily
107. Id. art. 160, para. 2(f).
108. Id. art. 158, para. 4.
109. Id. art. 162.
110. Id. para. 2(j).
111. Id. art. 163, para. 1.
112. Id. art. 165, para. 2(b). These determinations are to be made solely on the
grounds stated in Annex III of the Convention. Id
113. Draft Final Act of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea, Annex I, res. II U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/121 (1982).
114. Convention, supra note 2, art. 164, para. 2(b).
115. Id. para. 2(d).
influenced by exporting the minerals.116
Both commissions are to be composed of fifteen members se-
lected by the Council.117 Members must have appropriate qualifi-
cations relevant to their functions."i8 The United States and
other industrialized nations will most likely have significant input
on the commissions by virtue of the large number of their nation-
als possessing these qualifications.1 9 Developing nations view
these committees as powerful, but subject to strong influence by
developed states. This view is held because industrialized na-
tions have many personnel experienced in management of min-
eral resource activities, international trade and economics, and
processing mineral resources, which are included in the requisite
qualifications.120
The overall Council is composed of thirty-six members elected
from five categories. 121 Each member has one vote. The catego-
ries include: four of the eight States with the largest investments
in the Area,122 four of the largest consumers or net importers of
the nodule minerals,123 four major net exporters of the miner-
als,124 and six developing States with special interests. 25 The re-
maining eighteen seats are filled on the basis of equitable
geographic distribution, with at least one representative from
each enumerated region. 26 The Soviet States are guaranteed a
seat in both the investor127 and consumer128 categories. The
United States protested against this arrangement, claiming that
the Soviet Union and its allies were guaranteed three seats while
the United States had to compete with its allies for representa-
tion.129 A final concession to the United States was express inclu-
sion of the largest consumer in the consumer category. 30 The
116. See supra note 83.
117. Convention, supra note 2, art. 163, para. 2.
118. Id. para. 3.
119. Lee, supra note 82, at 219.
120. Id. at 218-19.
121. Convention, supra note 2, art. 161, para. 1.
122. Id. para. 1(b).
123. Id. para. 1(a).
124. Id. para. 1(c).
125. Id. para. l(d). These special interests include large populations, nations
which are land-locked or have short coastlines, major importers of the minerals to
be derived from the Area, potential producers of such minerals, and least devel-
oped States. Id
126. The regions are: Africa, Asia, Eastern (Socialist) Europe, Latin America,
and "Western Europe and others." The last category includes the United States,
Canada and Japan. Id.
127. Id. para. l(b).
128. Id. para. l(a).
129. Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The
Tenth Session (1981) 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 10 (1982).
130. MERCHANT MA mE REPORT, supra note 5, at 23.
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United States presently fits this criterion. As the Convention now
stands, Council composition would probably include three Soviet
States, nine industrialized nations (including the United States),
and twenty-four developing States.131
The Council has a three-tiered voting system. Consensus 132 is
required for the most important decisions, which include adopting
measures recommended by the Economic Planning Commission
to protect land-based mineral producers, or rejection of work
plans recommended by the Legal and Technical Commission.133
Consensus is also required for amending rules, regulations, and
procedures in the ISA or activities in the Area. 34 Most other sub-
stantive issues require a three-fourths majority vote.135 Less con-
troversial matters, such as examination of and recommendation
on reports, require a two-thirds majority for approval.136
Once initial rules are established by the Preparatory Commis-
sion, this voting structure prevents the G-77 from manipulating
the Council and adversely affecting industrial economic interests.
Consensus is required on decisions that have the greatest effect
on seabed mining nations. Therefore, each Council member will
have a veto power137 on decisions such as contract denial to a
qualified mining applicant or amendments to the ISA structure. If
the rules provided by the Preparatory Commission are accepta-
ble, industrialized nations will be protected by them. 38 The
United States could be very influential on the Preparatory Com-
mission because the same issues have already been considered
in the United States own deep sea mining legislation. 3 9
With nine members, the industrialized nations will require only
one additional vote to block adverse decisions requiring three-
131. Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The
Ninth Session (1980). 75 AM. J. INV'L L. 211, 218-19 (1981).
132. Consensus is defined as the absence of any formal objection. Convention,
supra note 2, art. 161, para. 7(e).
133. Id. art. 162, para. 2(i), (j).
134. Id.
135. Id. art. 161, para. 7(c). These decisions include establishing specific poli-
cies and recommendations to the Assembly of candidates for election to the Enter-
prise and Secretariat. Id.
136. Id. para. 7(b).
137. Under the consensus requirement, a dissenting Council member can block
a decision by formally objecting. Id. para. 7(e).
138. Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 13, at 24 (statement of Elliot
Richardson).
139. Id. at 34.
fourths majority of the thirty-six members. However, they will re-
quire the support of fifteen to eighteen members of the Soviet
bloc and G-77 to obtain a requisite majority to pass decisions they
desire. Mustering this support is not necessarily difficult. As dis-
cussed earlier, some Soviet interests' 40 and some interests of G-77
members are consistent with those of Western nations.14'
Thus, the initial rules established by the Preparatory Commis-
sion will determine effective guidelines to be followed in decision-
making. Industrialized nations can protect their deep sea mining
investments and secure access to the nodules by signing the Con-
vention' 42 and participating in the Preparatory Commission.
Through the constitutional safeguards and large majorities re-
quired for decisions in the ISA, their special interests are pro-
tected by the Convention.
Comparison to the United Nations: A Structure and Policy
Analysis
Examination of the decision-making organs in the United Na-
tions which parallel the ISA's Assembly and Council reveals both
similarities and variations in their structures. However, analysis
of the fundamental purposes of the two helps explain that differ-
ent decision-making systems may be appropriate in each. The
underlying bases and constitutional limitations of the two entities
are varied. Parameters set forth by the Convention should help
quell the United States fears that the G-77 will rule the ISA to the
detriment of the United States interests in deep sea mining.
The United Nations organs which parallel the ISA's are the
General Assembly and the Security Council. The General Assem-
bly is the United Nation's plenary body recognizing the sovereign
equality of member nations.143 Each member has one vote.144
Resolutions are passed by a two-thirds majority.145 These resolu-
tions have no binding legal effect, but they are influential as an
expression of world opinion.146
An examination of recent voting in the General Assembly ex-
emplifies the industrialized nations' concern that their interests
140. Byrum, An International Seabed Authority: The Impossible Dream? 10
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L 621, 641 (1978).
141. Friedman & Williams, supra note 87, at 563-72.
142. If the industrial nations do not sign the Convention, they will not have a
vote in the Preparatory Commission. MERCHANT MARNE REPoRT, supra note 5, at
44.
143. U.N. CHARTER, art 2, para. 1.
144. Id. art. 18, para. 1.
145. Id. para. 2. Questions on important matters require a two-thirds majority,
other decisions only call for a simple majority. Id.
146. Charney, supra note 70, at 55.
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will not be protected by the ISA Assembly.147 Resolutions sup-
porting the G-77 goal of the NIEO have been adopted over the op-
position or abstention of developed nations.148 These resolutions
include the moratorium on deep sea mining' 49 and others pertain-
ing to the economic rights and duties of States. 5 0 The G-77 and
Soviet bloc generally voted in favor of such resolutions,1
51
whereas, the United States often voted against them.15 2 Other in-
dustrialized nations, including Japan, Australia, Iand Western Eu-
ropean nations, usually abstained.
5 3
However, these resolutions have been within the rationale
which underlies the United Nations establishment. The United
Nations Charter includes in its purposes international coopera-
tion in solving international economic and social problems,154 a
category which arguably includes the resolutions discussed.
147. The author examined resolutions and decisions adopted by the General
Assembly's second committee, which is concerned with economic and financial
matters. Most of these decisions were made without a vote. See U.N. Dep't of
Pub. Information, Press Release GA/6375 (Jan. 21, 1981) [hereinafter cited as
Press Release GA/63751; U.N. Dep't of Pub. Information, Press Release GA/6546
(Jan. 4, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Press Release GA/6546].
148. See, e.g., Resolution on the Transfer of Technology, GAL Res. 34/199, 34
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 137, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1980); U.N. Conference of
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) decisions, Press Release GA/6375, supra note
147, at 201; GA/6546 supra note 147, at 213; problems of remnants of war, Press Re-
lease GA/6546 supra note 147, at 240.
149. GA. Res. 2574, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 10-11, U.N. Doc. A/7630
(1969).
150. NIEO, .pra note 78; Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States,
GA. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 50-1, U.N. Doc. A/9946 (1974).
151. Press Release GA/6546, supra note 147, at 226. The Soviet Union voted
against the Moratorium Resolution in conjunction With the United States and
other industrialized nations. Israel, Ivory Coast, Malawi, Morocco, Niger, New
Zealand, Senegal, and Upper Volta abstained in the vote on problems of remnants
of war. Id.
152. See id. The United States voted against the transfer of technology, the
Moratorium Resolution, the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties, and ab-
stained in the remainder of the votes. See Press Release GA/6546, supra note 147,
at 215, 226; Press Release GA/6375, supra note 149, at 198, 202.
153. Press Release GA/6546, supra note 147, at 215, 226; Press Release GA/6375
supra note 147, at 198, 202. The nations abstaining in the Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties were: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and the United
Kingdom. These nations were joined by Australia, Austria, Finland New Zealand
Portugal, Spain, and Switzerland by abstaining in the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development and remnants of war votes. Id.
154. U.N. CHARTER Preamble, art 1, para. 2.
These principles were established in 1945,155 before many G-77
nations had gained their independence. Therefore, these less de-
veloped states did not negotiate to embody these purposes in the
United Nations. However, these principles initiated by the United
States and other United Nations founders156 are relevant to cur-
rent NIEO objectives. The apparent rejection by the United
States of these principles appears contradictory.
The ISA was established to promote rational development of
the seabed resources, while simultaneously protecting the econo-
mies of land-based suppliers. 5 7 Decisions made by the ISA must
be consistent with its framework. In addition to constitutional
protections, the schism of thinking in the G-77 and ambivalence of
the Soviet States referred to earlier may result in voting by them
that is consistent with industrial nations' objectives.
An analogy can be drawn from the United Nations organization.
That body was conceived during World War H, with a principal
goal of preventing future suffering from war-related atrocities. 58
The United Nations Security Council has ten non-permanent
members and five permanent members. 5 9 Concurring votes of all
five permanent members is required for decisions on substantive
matters.160 The United States would like a similar veto power to
protect its interest in the ISA Council.161 However, there are fun-
damental differences in the purposes of the two councils. The
United Nations founders delegated the responsibility for main-
taining international peace to the Security Council.I 2 The five
permanent member nations were perceived to be the countries
most capable of maintaining world peace through their military
and navigational strength and advanced industries.163 The veto
power was viewed as an aid to fostering world peace since deci-
sions would be agreed to by all permanent members. 6 4
155. U.N. DEP'T OF PUB. INFORMATION, BASIC FACTS ABouT THE UNITED NATIONS
2 (1980). The United Nations officially came into existence on October 24, 1945. Id.
156. The founders included the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, China, France,
the United States and other nations involved in World War IL Japan and Ger-
many were not admitted until 1956 and 1973 respectively. T. HOvET, S'upra note 59,
at 244-47.
157. Convention, supra note 2, art. 156, para. 2.
158. REPORT TO THE PRESMENT, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 9-10 (1945)
(reprint 1969).
159. U.N. CHARTER art 23, para. 1. The five permanent members are China,
France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. Id.
160. Id. art. 27, para. 3.
161. Zamora, Voting in International Economic Organizations, AM. J. INT'L L.
566, 586 (1980).
162. U.N. CHARTER art. 24, para. 1.
163. REPORT TO THE PRESMENT, supra note 158, at 68-69.
164. Id.
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The United States interests in deep sea mining are basically
economic. Furtherance of United States economic interests
would not benefit other nations as do attempts by the Security
Council to maintain world peace. There is no compelling reason
to favor industrialized nations' mining interests over the interests
of other nations as there was in the formation of the Security
Council. Deep sea mining is a new international venture. Al-
though mining companies have spent several hundred million dol-
lars developing technology, no country has a legal claim to an
exclusive area of the seabed as yet.165 While the United States
will have large investments at stake, other nations have valid eco-
nomic concerns which may have a greater proportionate effect on
their economies.166 Some developing nations' economies are de-
pendent on mineral exports. To deprive them of this income
could result in increased poverty. The G-77 members also have
justifiable aspirations of increased political recognition and eco-
nomic independence, 6 7 which they hope to advance through the
Enterprise.
Although the G-77 opposed veto power for any special interest
group,168 it agreed to the more democratic method of consensus
on the most important issues.169 As the largest consumer, the
United States would have a guaranteed seat on the ISA Council
and veto power on decisions requiring consensus, those most per-
tinent to its interests. With these powers, and in light of the va-
ried interests involved in deep sea mining, it is difficult to justify
the United States position that its interests are not being propor-
tionately represented.
CONCLUSION
The United States contention that the ISA fails to protect pro-
portionately the interests involved is inaccurate. If analysis of
relevant concerns is examined on a strictly economic basis, indus-
trialized nations will have the largest capital investment in the
165. Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 13, at 9 (statement of Elliot Rich-
ardson, former special representative to the President).
166. See supra note 83.
167. See Pinto, supra note 74, at 36.
168. Adede, The Group of 77 and the Establishment of the International Sea-Bed
Authority, 7 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 31, 48 (1979).
169. Convention, supra note 2, art. 161, para. 7(d).
ISA. However, the value of G-77 political aspirations and relative
economic concerns should be considered in this determination.
The United States can best protect its overall interests from
within the framework of UNCLOS M. By signing the Convention,
the United States will have a more influential impact on the Pre-
paratory Commission in determining rules and regulations for
deep sea mining. Acceptance of the treaty will also increase
United States economic interests in the exploitation of ocean re-
sources in the exclusive economic zone, the continental shelf, and
the deep seabed. Strategic and military interests in navigation
and foreign relations will be enhanced by cooperation in an inter-
national legal regime. Only by signature and active participation
in the Preparatory Commission can the United States fully pro-
tect its deep sea mining interests. The negative economic and
socio-political ramifications will be much greater for the United
States by remaining outside the international framework estab-
lished by the Convention than the effects of embracing the Con-
vention perceived by the Reagan administration.
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